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Non–technical Summary
Since the German re–unification in 1990, the German government tries to
foster the transition process of the Eastern German economy by means
of different kinds of policy instruments. However, the vast majority of
firms in Eastern Germany has been newly founded after 1990 and hence
these firms are smaller than Western German companies on average, and
a large share of them is struggling to survive. The still underdeveloped
infrastructure and, additionally, the breakdown of the eastern European
markets possibly hamper a positive development of Eastern Germany.
From the macroeconomic point of view, the situation in the Eastern
German producing sector is alarming: The re–unification has been fol-
lowed by a phase of catching up in value added compared with Western
Germany from 1991 to 1996. Since 1997, the growth rates of the Eastern
German producing sector have dropped below the ones of Western Germany.
This study investigates whether this macroeconomic picture holds at the
microeconomic level. The question arises if most firms in Eastern Germany
suffer disadvantages in productivity or if there is just another misallocation
present: for example, unfavorable factor combinations in production or
not reaching the minimum efficiency scale due to the small firm size. The
traditional approach of analyzing productivity is to estimate production
functions. I suggest an alternative method to identify productivity gaps.
In the special case of Eastern Germany, it is possible to use the Western
German economy as a “productivity benchmark”. If this is considered,
one can apply a matching estimator to find suitable Western German
control observations for every Eastern German company which have the
same characteristics like size, industry classification, assets, innovation
activities and so on. Matching methods are usually applied to estimate
treatment effects, mainly in labor market research and recently also in
industrial economics to evaluate the impact of technology policies on
innovation. Matching is a non–parametric approach and has therefore
the advantage that no production function has to be specified and no
assumptions on functional forms have to be imposed. It allows to esti-
mate the differences in productivity without any distributional assumptions.
In this paper, I apply a non–parametric matching to eight cross–sections
of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) referring to the years 1993 to
2000. The estimation results broadly confirm the macroeconomic picture:
the catching–up of Eastern German productivity was largest in the first
years after the re–unification and has been declining since then, and a sig-
nificant gap still remains in recent years. However, the matching does also
allow to identify variables which influence the size of the gap to Western
German firms. In more detail, the analysis shows that innovators in East-
ern Germany perform worse than non–innovative firms: In relation to the
Western German control group, the estimation discovers a higher gap for in-
novating firms. Although innovating firms show a higher productivity than
non–innovators, they perform relatively worse with respect to their control
group. Moreover, ownership structure is an important topic. If an Eastern
German firm belongs to a group with a Western German or foreign parent
company, it has a higher productivity than stand–alone companies on av-
erage. This result does even hold when the group variable is considered as
endogenous, that is when the parent companies follow a “picking the win-
ner” strategy. Matching such Eastern German subsidiaries with stand–alone
companies does not destroy this finding. The gap between those two groups
within Eastern Germany remains significant. In contrast to the result that
the gap between the East and the West closes over time, the gap between
these firms slightly increases over time. This diverging development points
to the hypothesis of positive spillovers. Either managerial skills are medi-
ated via the ownership structure or simply a better access to markets due to
a well functioning distributional network of the group members is provided.
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Abstract
Since the German re–unification in 1990, Eastern Germany is a
transition economy. After a phase of catching up of productivity with
respect to Western Germany from 1991 to 1996, the growth rates in
the producing sector have dropped below the Western German ones
since 1997. This study investigates whether this macroeconomic pic-
ture holds at the microeconomic level. For the special case of Eastern
Germany, I suggest to identify productivity gaps by a comparison with
Western Germany as a “productivity benchmark”. Applying an econo-
metric matching procedure allows to study the productivity gap at the
firm level in detail. Besides labor and capital, other factors like inno-
vation or firm ownership are taken into account. The macroeconomic
facts are broadly confirmed: a significant gap still remains in recent
years. Moreover innovators in Eastern Germany perform worse than
their Western German pendants and firms owned by Western German
or foreign companies perform better than Eastern German owned ones.
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1 Introduction
Since the German re–unification in 1990, the economy of Eastern Germany
is in transition from a planned economy to a market economy. The opti-
mistic hypothesis that a second “Wirtschaftswunder” as after the second
world war in Western Germany will occur in Eastern Germany after 10
years turned out to be falsified. While the productivity growth in Eastern
Germany has been large in the early years, the growth rates dropped under
the Western German ones in 1996 and remain low since then (see Figure 1).
The catching–up process of the Eastern German economy to the Western
standard is stagnating and the productivity gap remains large. The Eastern
German aggregate productivity (GPD per employable person) reached only
35% of the Western German level in 1991, but rose up to 60.6% of the corre-
sponding western level in 1996. However, the East–West ratio is stabilizing
around this level since then. In 2002, it has been 58.4% (Source: Sinn, 2003).
Figure 1:
Growth rates of value added in the producing sector
Source: Arbeitskreis VGR der La¨nder, Statistisches Landesamt Baden–Wu¨rttemberg
These discouraging macroeconomic facts are possibly partly due to the
lack of large companies in Eastern Germany. While the large “combines”
of the former German Democratic Republic had been closed down or
separated into several smaller companies, most firms have been newly
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founded after the re–unification. These are therefore smaller than Western
German firms on average, and presumbly still do not reach the minimum
efficiency scale. Hence, many are struggling to survive. In the 1990s,
the still underdeveloped infrastructure and, additionally, the breakdown
of the eastern European markets have possibly also hampered a more
positive development of Eastern Germany. Besides the problem of the lack
of industrial companies, it is unclear how much of the productivity gap
is due to other factors within the firms’ production process. Examples
are poor capital stocks, the lack of human capital (“know how”), the
misallocation of production factors, the lack of innovative products, or
inefficient management (cf. Ragnitz, 1997, for example). The purpose of
this paper is to analyze whether the macroecomic picture holds at the
microeconomic level, i.e. at the firm level, and to shed some light on the
reasons of the persisting productivity gap.
The traditional approach of analyzing productivity is to estimate produc-
tion functions (see e.g. Berndt, 1991, ch. 9 for an overview or Blundell
and Bond, 2000, Griliches and Mairesse, 1998, for recent studies). In this
paper, I suggest an alternative method to identify productivity gaps. In the
special case of the transition economy of Eastern Germany, it is possible
to use the Western German economy as a “productivity benchmark”. If
this is considered, one can apply a matching estimator to find a Western
German “twin” for every Eastern German company which has the same
characteristics like size, industry classification, innovation activities and
so on. Matching methods are usually applied to estimate treatment
effects, mainly in labor market research and recently also in industrial
economics to evaluate the impact of technology policies on innovation.
Matching is a non–parametric approach and has, therefore, the advantage
that no production function has to be specified and no assumptions on
functional forms have to be imposed. It allows to estimate the difference
in productivity without any distributional assumptions. In this paper, I
apply a non–parametric matching to eight cross–sections of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP) referring to the years 1993 to 2000. The matching
also allows to identify single variables which may influence the productivity.
Besides the central factors labor and capital, other variables like knowledge
assets, innovation, firm ownership etc. are considered.
The following section summarizes some results from previous studies on the
topic. The econometric approach is presented in the third section, and the
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fourth section discusses the empirical analysis.
2 Brief Review of the Literature
Since an important publication on the economic aspects of the Eastern
German transformation process in 1991 (Sinn and Sinn, 1991), a lot of
studies were conducted on this topic. In this paper, I focus on literature
dealing with the productivity gap, but as the main emphasis in this paper
is the empirical application, the existing literature is only discussed briefly.
One strand of literature is the application of macroeconomic growth theory.
Some studies dicsuss the “iron law of convergence” which predicts a rate of
convergence of roughly 2% between regions. Several studies have applied
such growth theoretic models to Eastern Germany, and some have argued
that the convergence of Eastern Germany will be faster due to different
reasons (see, among others, Burda and Funke, 1995, or in contrast to this
Hughes Hallet et al., 1996, as depressing forecast on Eastern Germany’s
future performance).
More recently, Burda and Hunt (2001) state among other findings that the
productivity gap is constant across skill–levels. Therefore they look for
other skill–neutral explanations, like an inferior infrastructure. Although
some types of infrastructure are as good as in Western Germany, they
recommend continued investment in types of infrastructure which still
lag behind. Moreover, Burda and Hunt hypothesize that a deficiency
of business skills could reduce productivity at all skill levels. Although
they do not provide original evidence on this, they recommend a further
investigation of this topic. This is in line with Quehenberger (2000) who
has emphasized that “[...] human capital with marketing experience may
become the binding constraint for convergence to progress” (Quehenberger,
2000: 133). Barrell and te Velde (2000) also argue that further convergence
may be embedded in the stock of human capital instead of further capital
deepening. Bellmann and Brussig (1998) do also point out that rather ‘soft
factors’ like managerial issues and the integration of the plant or firm into
the company or group respectively are more important than structural
fators like tangible assets and so on.
Klodt (2000) even holds industrial policies responsible for the productivity
gap. He criticizes the focus of public subsidization on capital formation
in Eastern Germany. “The strategy of fostering of capital intensity
hampered the development of viable industrial structures based upon
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human capital–intensive and service–intensive products and production
processes.” (Klodt, 2000: 330) He concludes that the sectoral structure is
distorted in favor of capital– intensive industries. In contrast, there is a
low weight of human capital–intensive industries and a lack of intermediate
services which are essential for the provision of sophisticated industrial
goods and higher growth rates. Klodt points out that the Eastern German
industry composition resembles the structure of declining regions in Western
Germany. He predicts that another wave of painful adjustment will turn up
when subsidies are reduced and structures relying upon subsidized capital
input are no longer sheltered from market competiton. In contrast, Dietrich
(1997) writes a main reason for the productivity gap is the circumstance
that production in Eastern Germany is less capital–intensive (cf. also
Ragnitz, 1997 and 1999). The weak export performance of Eastern German
firms is according to Ragnitz (1997) one main reason for the productivity
gap. On one hand, the small start–up firms are especially hampered
by higher entry barriers on international markets. On the other hand,
disadvantages in the competitiveness are revealed, e.g. lower product
quality, strategic orientation of firms or in marketing.
There are also two studies which use data from the Mannheim Innovation
Panel as done here. The focus of both studies is innovation. Falk and
Pfeiffer (1998) estimate translog production functions and distinguish inno-
vating and non–innovating firms from both Eastern and Western Germany.
They find that in 1994 productivity growth of innovating Eastern German
firms with both product and process innovations has been substantially
larger than for non–innovating (or only product innovating) firms from
Eastern Germany. For Western German firms Falk and Pfeiffer do not find
such differences. Falk and Pfeiffer (1999) investigate innovation–related
productivity growth in Eastern Germany with slightly different tools in
comparison to their previous study and with an additional wave of the
MIP (up to 1995). They conclude that process innovations have led to
productivity growth of 7 to 8%.
Another study, closely related to this paper, is Fritsch and Mallok (1994).
They apply the matched pair methodology, although not in econometric
sense. Fritsch and Mallok conducted interviews with 52 small and medium–
sized Eastern German firms in 1992. For each interviewee they select a
Western German counterpart with similar characteristics (size, industry
classification, etc). They conclude that the interviewed firms from Eastern
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Germany only reach 45.6% of value added per employee in comparison to
Western Germany. As one main reason Fritsch and Mallok identify the
lower operating rate in Eastern Germany. While the Western German firms
used about 90% of their production capacity in 1992, Eastern German
interviewees only reached 63% on average. However, even the construction
of a scenario with a 100% operating rate only yields an Eastern–Western
productivity ratio of 67.3% (see Hitchens et al., 1993, for a related study).
Rothfels (1997) constructs similar scenarios at the industry level. She
concludes that the different industry structures in Western and Eastern
Germany are not responible for the productivity gap, neither at the
macroeconomic level nor at the sectoral level (manufacturing sector).
As Smolny (2002) points out there is no study that provides a comprehen-
sive discussion of all possible determinants of the productivity gap. In this
paper, I focus on innovation and ownership structure besides other more
conventional characteristics like firm size, sectors, firm age and fixed capi-
tal.
3 Econometrics
Matching and Identification
The matching approach was originally developed to identify treatment
effects when the available observations on individuals are subject to
a selection bias. This typically occurs when participants differ from
non–participants in observable and/or unobservable characteristics (see
Heckman et al., 1999, or Heckmann et al., 1997, for surveys). Popular
economic examples are studies on the effects of active labor market
policies. In this study, the matching estimator is not used to identify
such policy effects. The aim is to separate differences based on observable
characteristics between Eastern and Western German companies from the
productivity gap emerging from unknown reasons internal to the firm. The
advantage over a parametric regression analysis is that one does not have
to assume a functional form of the productivity equation. The matching
is able to directly address the question “What could be expected from
an Eastern German firm with given characteristics if it were a Western
German firm?” The matching will be carried out for eight cross–sections
of data at the firm level. Hence, it is possible to analyze whether the gap
between both German regions is closing over time and whether it still exists
in recent years. A parametric regression on productivity which includes
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just a dummy for Eastern German firms may possibly be too restrictive
to capture this difference carefully, especially when Eastern and Western
German companies differ strongly in other important characteristics, like
firm size etc. The matching estimator individually balances the sample
with respect to the variables included in the analysis for each observation
from Eastern Germany.
The fundamental question can be illustrated by an equation describing the
average treatment effect on the treated individuals or firms, respectively:2
E(θ) = E(Y T |S = 1)− E(Y C|S = 1) (1)
where Y T is the outcome, in our case productivity, of the ‘treatment group’
Eastern German firms. The status S refers to the group: S = 1 is the
treatment group (Eastern Germany) and S = 0 the non–treated individuals
(Western German firms). Y C is the potential productivity which had been
realized if the Eastern German firms (S = 1) would be Western German
ones. The problem is obvious: while the outcome of the treated individuals
in case of treatment, E(Y T |S = 1), is directly observable, this is not the
case for the counterpart. What would these individuals have realized if they
had not received the treatment, E(Y C|S = 1), is a counterfactual situation
which is not observable and, therefore, has to be estimated. In this case, the
potential outcome is constructed from a control group of Western German
firms.3 The matching relies on the intuitively attracting idea to balance
the sample of Eastern German firms and a control group of comparable
Western German firms. Remaining differences in the outcome variable
between both groups are then attributed to the measure (Heckman et al.,
1998), which means in this case the fact that firms are Eastern German ones.
Initially the counterfactual cannot simply be estimated as average outcome
of the non–treated, because E(Y C|S = 1) 6= E(Y C|S = 0) due to the
possible selection bias. The treated group and the non–treated group can
be expected to differ from each other, except in cases of randomly assigned
measures in experimental settings. Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) to overcome the selection problem, that is,
2In the following, I use the term ‘treatment’ as the literature origins in this field of
research. However, it is not intended to interpret ‘being an Eastern German firm’ as
treatment.
3There exist other approaches in the treatment literature like a before–after compar-
ison of treated firms, and a difference–in–difference estimation, where treated and not
treated firms are compared before and after the treatment (see Heckmann et al., 1999, for
example).
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participation and potential outcome are independent for individuals with
the same set of exogenous characteristics X. If this assumption is valid, it
follows that
E(Y C|S = 1, X) = E(Y C|S = 0, X). (2)
The outcome of the non–treated can be used to estimate the counterfactual
outcome of the treated in case of non–treatment provided that there are no
systematic differences between both groups. The treatment effect can be
written as
E(θ) = E(Y T |S = 1, X = x)− E(Y C|S = 0, X = x). (3)
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable
differences between treated and non–treated.
Estimation of the counterfactual
A weight wij is defined with respect to X for each Eastern German firm i
which assignes a high weight to Western German firms j being similar in X
and vice versa. The weights wij sum up to one. The ‘treatment effect’ for
the Eastern German firm i is
Y Ti −
∑
j
wijY Cj . (4)
The outcome of the Eastern firm i is compared to the weighted outcome
of all Western German companies j. According to Heckman et al. (1998)
matching estimators differ with respect to the weights attached to members
of the comparison group. The extreme cases are to use all non–treated
firms as control group or to pick just the most similar control observation.
The latter case is called nearest neighbor matching. The weight would be
equal to one for the most similar control observation and would be zero
for all other cases. Nearest neighbor matching has already been applied in
industrial economic literature to estimate the impact of R&D subsidies on
R&D investment at the firm level (see Czarnitzki, 2001, Czarnitzki and Fier,
2002, Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). In this study, a kernel–based matching
is applied. In contrast to the nearest neighbor matching where only one
control observation is assigned to each Eastern German firm, the entire
group of Western German firms is used for every firm from Eastern Germany.
Therefore, a non–parametric regression in the sample of Western German
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firms is performed to determine the weights for the potential productivity
of an Eastern German firm. The weights are specified as
wij =
K((Xj −Xi)/h)∑
j
K((Xj −Xi)/h)
. (5)
The kernel K downweights observations with respect to their distance to
Xi. h is the bandwidth parameter. The weights are obtained by a non–
parametric regression that is a locally weighted average of the outcome of
the Western German firms with similar characteristics. In this case, the
Nadaraya–Watson kernel regression is applied. The minimization problem
to obtain the non–treatment estimate for individual i is (see Pagan and
Ullah, 1999, section 3.2)
m(Xi) = min
m
∑
j
(Y Cj −m)2K
(
Xj −Xi
h
)
. (6)
The resulting estimator equals∑
j
K((Xj −Xi)/h)∑
j
K((Xj −Xi)/h)
Yj =
∑
j
wijYj . (7)
Instead of a single X, several characteristics of the individuals may be em-
ployed in the matching function. Therefore the Mahalanobis distance
MDij = (Xj −Xi)′Ω−1(Xj −Xi) (8)
is used as the argument in the kernel function. Ω is the empirical covariance
matrix of the vector Xj . Finally, the kernel function and the bandwidth
have to be chosen. I use the Gaussian kernel
K =
1
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(
MDij
h
)2)
. (9)
and the bandwidth h is chosen according to Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb
as
h = k
(
0.9n−1/5
)2
(10)
where k is the number of variables included in X.
The Nadaraya–Watson kernel regression is performed for every Eastern
German firm in the sample, that is, an estimate of the potential productivity
for each i is constructed from the entire sample of Western German firms.
Once the samples have been balanced by the kernel matching procedure,
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remaining differences in the outcomes are not due to previous heterogeneity
in observable characteristics, but can be assigned to the treatment if no
selection on unobservables occurs.
4 Empirical Study
As a simple break–up of the macroeconomic data available from the federal
statistical office (see Figures 1 and 2) shows that one should distinguish
the manufacturing sector and the construction sector within the producing
sector. The focus of this study is Eastern German manufacturing. Although
it becomes clear that the decline in the construction sector is to a large
extent responsible for the macroeconomic picture as shown in Figure 1, the
basic statement remains the same. As the time–series in Figure 2 reveal,
the growth rates in Eastern Germany fall below the Western German
ones in the mid nineties in both manufacturing and construction. The
reason is quite clear in the construction sector: after a phase of impressive
growth from 1992 to 1994 due to the demand pull after the re–unification,
the construction firms were not able to cope with the decrease in public
demand for new housing. Why the performance of Eastern Germany
does also decline in manufacturing is not as easy to explain, and remains
an interesting question to investigate. Is the productivity of labor and
capital stagnating in Eastern German manufacturing, and which factors do
influence the productivity besides labor and capital?
Figure 2:
Growth rates of value added in manufacturing and construction
Manufacturing sector Construction sector
Source: Arbeitskreis VGR der La¨nder, Statistisches Landesamt Baden–Wu¨rttemberg
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4.1 Data and empirical modeling
Most information is taken from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP).
The MIP is an annual German innovation survey conducted since 1992
by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Firms
surveyed in the MIP are selected by a stratified random sampling and
are representative for the population in the manufacturing sector (and
several service sectors) of the German economy (cf. Janz et al., 2001, for a
description of the database).
It is unclear how the German capital, Berlin, should be treated in the
data in the context of this study. West–Berlin has of course been a part
West–Germany, although it is located in the eastern part of the country.
Berlin is even important in the macroeconomic figures (see Figures 1 and
2) when it is assigned to Eastern Germany. As it is not meaningful in this
analysis to treat Berlin either as Eastern Germany or as Western Germany,
I decided to drop firms located in this city from the analysis completely.
A sample of 15,279 observations on manufacturing firms from the years 1993
to 2000 can be used. Table 1 displays the distribution of observations over
the period under review.
Table 1:
Sample of manufacturing firms
Year Western Germany Eastern Germany Total
1993 1562 649 2211
1994 1549 590 2139
1995 1181 429 1610
1996 1240 513 1753
1997 1110 458 1568
1998 1208 483 1691
1999 1030 448 1478
2000 1054 446 1500
Total 10913 4366 15279
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel — Manufacturing Sector
The dependent variable is value added per employee in Mio. À
Value added per employeeit =
Salesit −materialsit
employeesit
.
It is deflated by a price index for producer goods on a two–digit industry
level. The sample confirms the macroeconomic picture: The left–hand side
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of Figure 3 shows the sample means of the firm–level observations in the
MIP. The Eastern German firms are catching up only slowly to the Western
German productivity level since the mid–nineties. The right–hand side of
Figure 3 shows the ratio of the Eastern German value added per employee
to the Western German one (based on the sample means). In 2000 there is
still a gap of 35%.
Figure 3:
Value added per employee in the MIP (manufacturing sector)
Value added per employee (sample means) Eastern German productivity gap
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel — Manufacturing Sector
Unfortunately, the MIP does not contain identical information for all years
and therefore, I will perform two different estimations. The first estimations
covers the whole period from 1993 to 2000, but does not contain the
full set of exogenous variables as considered in the following subsection.
Additionally, an estimation is conducted with the full set of variables, but
this covers only selected years from the sample, that is when all information
is available in the MIP survey.
The main input factors of production are obviously labor and capital. Labor
is measured as the number of employees and capital as tangible assets per
employee (capital intensity). Eastern German firms are on average smaller
than Western firms as indicated by both employees and fixed assets. Of
course, the sectoral classification is captured by a set of dummy variables
in the regressions. Firms from the control group which are engaged in a
different sector than the particular Eastern German firm receive a weight
equal to zero in the matching procedure.
Moreover, the companies are distinguished with respect to innovation. As
described in section 2, innovative products and processes are often seen as a
key factor of firm performance. An innovating firm is defined as proposed in
the OLSO–Manual: A firm having introduced at least one product or process
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new to the firm within the recent three years is considered to be innovative.4
As the reading of other studies suggests, human capital may be an
important feature of successfully operating firms, especially with respect to
innovation. As Klodt (2000) points out, Eastern German firms may suffer
from an underprovision of human capital and may therefore not be able to
produce highly sophisticated products and employ highly efficient processes
both needed to enter new markets and to compete on domestic and foreign
markets. Of course, firms with highly skilled staff is expected to be able to
produce the knowledge necessary to develop new products or introduce new
processes. The most straightforward measure for human capital would be
the formal qualification of employees, but it is a well–known fact that the
formal qualification in the former GDR has, on average, been higher than
in Western Germany. The share of graduates in Eastern German firms is
still higher than in Western German ones. However, the actual qualification
of such graduates may well be below the Western German standard. On
one hand, the human capital of older employees from the former GDR
may be outdated from the perspective of today’s job specifications. On
the other hand, there is an oversupply of formally highly skilled people in
Eastern Germany due to the high rates of unemployment which results in
rather high qualification patterns in Eastern German firms. However, the
jobs these people are actually employed for, do not correspond to their skills.
I have experimented with the formal qualification structure despite its
deficiencies, but it turns out to be inappropriate in the matching procedure.
I had calculated the share of graduates as indicator for the firms’ human
capital stock. If one tries to match the samples with respect to size and
human capital, it turns out that the Eastern German firms ceteris paribus
show a higher share of graduates than Western firms. Once the firm size
and other basic characteristics (sectoral classification) are fixed, it is not
possible to find proper matching firms with comparable shares of graduates
in Western Germany. This indicates that the formal qualification may not
reveal the actual qualification employed on the job in Eastern Germany.
Therefore, I use the knowledge stock of firms as an alternative variable.
This is approximated by the stock of patents, because as described above a
closely related topic to human capital is innovation. The use of knowledge
stocks as important assets of firms has become popular since a seminal study
4See Eurostat and OECD, 1997, for the exact definition.
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of Griliches (1981) who investigated how firm values are comprised of the
stock of physical assets and of intangible assets, i.e. of the knowledge stock.
Several studies were conducted on this topic (see Hall 2000 for a survey).
The results can be summarized as follows: a firm’s stock of knowledge is an
important asset even though it does not appear in its balance sheet. Usually,
the knowledge stock is measured as the stock of past R&D expenditure or
as patent stock, sometime weighted by citations (see Hall et al. 2001). In
this paper, the information on the knowledge stock is taken from the patent
database of the German Patent and Trademark Office. This database
allows to derive the patent stock (PSt) from firm–individual time–series
on patent applications since 1980. See OECD (1994) for a comprehensive
discussion on the use of patents as science and technology indicators. An
alternative measure would be the R&D stock, but it is not possible to
derive the R&D stock from the data available (firm–year observation on
R&D expenditure), because many firms are only observed once in the MIP
sample. For the calculation of firm–individual R&D stocks long time–series
information on annual R&D expenditures would be required. On one hand,
the R&D stock is a more general measure of knowledge. It is known that
patent counts underestimate the innovation potential of firms because not
every research result is patented due to limitations in patentability of new
knowledge and the firms’ preference for secrecy and lead time advantages as
a protection for their intellectual property (see e.g. for the United States:
Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al., 2000; or for Germany: Ko¨nig and Licht,
1995). On the other hand, R&D may be a noisy measure of innovation
potential because not every research activity must be successful and lead
to usable results for the firm. If patents are considered as a measure for
the knowledge stock, one issue should be clarified: One could choose either
patent applications or patents granted. In Germany, the number of patent
applications in 1999 (2001) is, for example, 61,283 (64,151) but only 15,008
(14,707) patents were granted (Source: German Patent Office, 2000, 2001).
Using only patent grants as a measure of knowledge stocks would therefore
cause a severe downward bias. Moreover, patent applications will be closer
to the time of original knowledge production, but the time lag between
patent applications and grants may be large. Therefore, I prefer to use the
stock of patent applications instead of patents granted because it indicates
a stock of useful research results, at least from the particular firm’s point
of view. Even if a number of filed patents is not granted, the technological
knowledge behind them could be used for the development of innovative
processes and products.
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The stock of applications is calculated by the perpetual inventory method
as
PSt = (1− δ)PSt−1 + PAt.
PAt is the number of patent applications in period t and δ is the annual
depreciation of the knowledge capital which is set to 0.15 (see also Hall,
1990). As the patent series is available since 1980 and the sample under
consideration begins in 1993, the starting value PS1980 is set to zero for
all firms. The bias possibly emerging from this assumptions reduces over
the years due to depreciation and should be negligible in the 1990’s.5 Of
course, not every firm has filed a patent: 42% (26%) of Western (Eastern)
German firms in the sample have a patent stock larger than zero. The
average patent stock of firms with at least one application in the period
under review is 7.6 (5.1) in Western (Eastern) Germany. The patent stocks
in Eastern Germany are obviously smaller because most firms did not exist
until the German re–unification in 1990.
Another important factor for productivity is the ownership of firms. It has
often been hypothesized that firms which are owned by Western German
or foreign companies develop differently compared to stand–alone Eastern
German firms. On one hand, the belonging to a larger group may enhance
the flow of knowledge spill–overs from more experienced enterprises to the
newly founded and smaller Eastern German firms. Another important
benefit for Eastern German firms, which belong to a group, could be the
access to a well functioning distribution network and thus a better access to
markets. On the other hand, critics of the argument concerning foreign (and
Western German) ownership often emphasize that the Eastern German
firms are only used as “extended workbenches” or “sweat–shops”. This
would imply that instead of receiving positive spill–overs from knowledge
flows and access to markets, Eastern German subsidiaries are only exploited.
The empirical analysis is expected to shed some light on these opposing
arguments.
5If a patent has been filed jointly by two or more applicants, the application is counted
for both of them because the knowledge behind the patent should be available to each of
the applicants.
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4.2 Basic analysis
The first matching procedure is carried out with only a few variables in
order to cover the whole period from 1993 to 2000. For it, the firm size is
used, the distribution over sectors, the population density of the district and
whether the firm is innovating, that is the firm has at least introduced a new
product or implemented a new process in recent three years. Prior to the
matching, the firms in Eastern and Western Germany are quite different.
Firms differ in size, are located in differently characterized districts and the
firm distribution is different over industries. See Table 2 for t–tests on mean
differences for the years 1993 and 2000.6
Table 2:
Mean Values prior to the matchinga
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1993 .50 .18***
(in 1,000) 2000 .33 .11***
Population 1993 7.58 5.11***
density 2000 6.96 4.60***
Innovation 1993 .68 .66
dummy 2000 .60 .62
Value added per 1993 .07 .03***
employee (Mio. À) 2000 .08 .05***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors differs significantly before the matching.
b) Obs. in 1993 (2000): 1,530 (1,042) in Western and 638 (445) in
Eastern Germany.
Table 3 presents the same statistics after the matching procedure. The
samples of Eastern Germany and its estimated control group are now well
balanced with respect to the elements included in the matching function.
The distribution over industries is now the same for both groups. However,
the productivity gap remains. While it has been about À 0,026 Mio. per
employee on average before the matching in 2000, it reduces to À 0,019 Mio.
after the matching procedure. Thus, about 27% of the observed productivity
gap in 2000 can be attributed to possible disadvantages of Eastern Germany
in factors like firm size, the sectoral composition, innovation and districts’
characteristics. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the productivity over time
and compares it before and after the matching.
6The tests for the years in between are not presented, but yield the same results.
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Table 3:
Mean Values after the matchinga
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1993 .17 .18
(in 1,000) 2000 .13 .11
Population 1993 5.35 5.11
density 2000 4.80 4.60
Innovation 1993 .65 .65
dummy 2000 .62 .62
Value added per 1993 .07 .03***
employee (Mio. À) 2000 .07 .05***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors is identical in both groups.
b) Obs. in 1993 (2000) in both groups: 638 (445)
Figure 4:
Value added per employee after matching by firm size, industry
classification and regional characteristics
Value added per employee (sample means) Eastern German productivity gap
The matching does now allow to analyze the remaining productivity gap in
more detail. Are there groups of firms which do perform better or worse than
average? A remarkable result is obtained by dividing the sample into inno-
vating firms and non–innovating ones. Recall that the innovation dummy
has been included in the matching function. As Figure 5 shows the East-
ern German innovators perform worse than the non–innovating firms. It is
important to note that this does not imply that innovation reduces produc-
tivity. Instead, the innovating firms are compared with innovative Western
German firms which have a high productivity even compared to the Western
German average. On the contrary, non–innovating Eastern German firms
are compared to those from Western Germany whose results are below the
Western German average. The results show that the Eastern German com-
panies are not able to utilize their innovation activities to the same extent
the Western German firms do. While the non–innovating firms do almost
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reach a productivity level of 80% of the matched controls, the innovating
firms are at 70% in 2000. Non–innovating firms did catch–up relatively bet-
ter than innovative firms. However, this may change in the future as the
East–West ratio of non–innovative firms is quite volatile. Figure 5 (left–
hand side) shows that since 1997 innovative Eastern German firms achieved
a slightly higher value added per employee than non–innovating firms. Pos-
sibly, firms with reasonable knowledge stocks become more and more able
to produce new products which reach the quality requested by consumers.
Figure 5:
Value added per employee of innovators and non–innovators
Value added per employee (sample means) Eastern German productivity gap
4.3 Basic analysis — Only young firms
In a further step, the sample is restricted to firms which are existing for ten
years at most. The vast majority of firms in Eastern Germany has been
newly founded after the German reunification and is therefore younger than
ten years. It may be possible that young firms have not been able to utilize
learning curve effects yet and show a lower productivity. Table 4 displays
that even the subsamples of young firms differ in size and productivity
between Eastern and Western Germany prior to the matching.
After balancing the sample of young firms with respect to size, industries
and the innovation dummy both groups do not differ in these characteristics.
However, as Table 5 shows, the difference in productivity between young
firms from Eastern and Western Germany remains significantly different
from zero. Even the argument that Eastern German companies are possibly
to young to have a similar productivity as Western German firms is not
striking. Young Eastern German firms have a lower productivity than their
matched controls from the West.
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Table 4:
Mean Values prior to the matchinga — Young firms
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1993 .31 .18***
(in 1,000) 2000 .22 .11***
Innovation 1993 .72 .66
dummy 2000 .59 .65
Value added per 1993 .07 .03***
employee (Mio. À) 2000 .08 .05***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors differs significantly before the matching.
b) Obs. in 1993 (2000): 250 (176) in Western and 614 (224) in
Eastern Germany.
Table 5:
Mean Values after the matchinga — Young firms
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1993 .15 .18
(in 1,000) 2000 .10 .11
Innovation 1993 .66 .66
dummy 2000 .65 .65
Value added per 1993 .06 .03***
employee (Mio. À) 2000 .07 .05***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors is identical in both groups.
b) Obs. in 1993 (2000) in both groups: 614 (224)
4.4 Extended Analysis
The previous estimations show that is is not possible to explain the pro-
ductivity gap only by differences in firm size, industry composition, regional
characteristics and innovation. As the review of the literature in section 2
suggests, other relevant factors are inputs like physical capital and human
capital. Unfortunately, this analysis is only possible for a subsample of the
years from 1994 to 1998 (excluding 1997) because not all information has
been surveyed annually. The matching procedure is now carried out with
the number of employees, sector controls, the capital stock (as intensity:
tangible assets per employee) and the knowledge assets that is the patent
stock. I include a dummy which indicates whether a firm has filed at least
one patent. 23% of Eastern German firms have at least one and 46% of
Western German firms. Moreover, I include the size of the patent stock as
described above (PS).
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Table 6:
Mean Values prior to the matchinga
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1994 .35 .12***
(in 1,000) 1998 .31 .13***
Capital 1994 .04 .04
intensity 1998 .04 .05***
Patent Stock 1994 .44 .17***
dummy 1998 .46 .29***
Patent Stock 1994 7.15 .67***
1998 6.78 1.61***
Value added per 1994 .07 .04***
employee (Mio. À) 1998 .07 .04***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors differs significantly before the matching.
b) Obs. in 1994 (1998): 1,507 (580) in Western and 1,171 (469) in
Eastern Germany.
Table 7:
Mean Values after the the matchinga
Variable Yearb Western Germany Eastern Germany
Employees 1994 .12 .12
(in 1,000) 1998 .12 .13
Capital 1994 .04 .04
intensity 1998 .06 .05
Patent Stock 1994 .17 .17
dummy 1998 .27 .29
Patent Stock 1994 .73 .67
1998 1.23 1.61
Value added per 1994 .06 .04***
employee (Mio. À) 1998 .07 .04***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the Eastern German mean differs from the
Western German one at a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors is identical in both groups.
b) Obs. in 1994 (1998) in both groups: 580 (469)
As Tables 6 and 7 show, the inclusion of the capital stock and knowledge
stock does not alter the basic result. The productivity gap remains signifi-
cantly different from zero. However, it is noteworthy that the capital stock
per employee is higher in Eastern Germany which is a result of the huge
initiatives of the German government to foster the transformation process.
It is still questionable why the Eastern German firms are not able to utilize
this advantage. Even if the disadvantage in knowledge assets is taken into
account (measured by patents) the matched control group still exhibits a
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higher value added per employee.
4.5 Firm Ownership
As final analysis, I consider firm ownership. Within the Eastern German
firms it is possible to distinguish stand–alone companies from those which
belong to a group with a Western German or foreign parent company.
If these firms are more productive than others, this would support the
hypothesis that there is still a lack of human capital with respect to
management and that a major problem of Eastern German firms could be
the poor access to markets. Bellman et al. (2002) did already state that
foreign owned firms have a higher productivity than other firms. However,
they did not control for firm heterogeneity as done here.
The matching results from above can be broken up into stand–alone compa-
nies from Eastern Germany and into firms which belong to a group with a
Western German or foreign parent company. Table 8 shows the productivity
gap from the perspective of Eastern German firms. The result is interesting:
although the productivity gap is shrinking between 1994 and 1998, the dif-
ference in value added per employee to the matched controls is diverging for
both groups. While the gap differs only a little in 1994 between stand–alone
companies and firms which belong to a Western German or foreign group
(À 0.005 Mio., significant at the 10% level only) it is larger in more recent
time. In 1998, the difference in the gap amount already to À 0.015 Mio.
Table 8:
Productivity gap of Eastern German firms after the matching
Stand–alone
Variable Yearb companies Subsidiaries
Diff. in value added
per empl. to matched 1994 .04 .04*
controls (Mio. À) 1998 .03 .01***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the means differ at a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
b) Obs. in 1994 (1998): 451 (365) stand–alone and 129 (104) group companies.
While this result is striking, it may be possible that this is not an exoge-
nous phenomenon. It may be the case that the parent companies follow a
“picking–the–winner” strategy and will thus select highly productive firms.
Therefore, I consider the ownership as endogenous variable in the final anal-
ysis and consider a propensity score matching as proposed by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). Then, the belonging to a group can actually be inter-
preted as a ‘treatment’. For this case, I only use Eastern German firms from
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the sample and match those which belong to a Western German or foreign
group with stand–alone companies from Eastern Germany. A probit model
on the ownership status is estimated and the resulting propensity scores
are used as matching criterion. The sample from Eastern Germany (1994
to 1996 and 1998) contains 464 firms that belong to a Western German or
foreign group and 1652 control observations of stand–alone companies. As
the control group is rather small, I include only the number of employees (in
logs), the sectors, the patent dummy, and the capital intensity as matching
criteria in the probit model. Age, the number of patents and the innovation
dummy have no significant effect on the group dummy. Table 9 shows the
mean values before the matching. The group firms are larger, have a higher
capital intensity and a higher share has at least one patent filed. Moreover
the value added per employee is higher as well. This already shows that the
group variable should be considered as endogenous. It seems that actually
potential ‘winners are picked’ if one agrees to consider ‘winners’ as knowl-
edge intensive firms as indicated by the capital intensity and the patent
dummy.
Table 9:
Productivity of stand–alone firms versus group members prior to the
matchinga
Stand–alone Firms belonging
Variable Yearb companies to group
log(Employees/1000) 1994 -3.15 -2.13***
1998 -3.21 -2.01***
Capital 1994 .03 .05***
intensity 1998 .04 .07***
Patent Stock 1994 .15 .29***
dummy 1998 .24 .45***
Propensity 1994 -1.10 -.40***
Score 1998 -1.16 -.29***
Value added per 1994 .03 .05***
employee (Mio. À) 1998 .04 .06***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the means differ at a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors differs significantly before the matching.
b) Obs. in 1994 (1998): 493 (378) stand–alone and 140 (110) group companies.
Balancing the sample leads to the estimation of the treatment effect which
is the difference in value added per employee between both groups. The
difference in productivity amounts to À 0.014 Mio. in 1994 and to À 0.016
Mio. in 1996 and both differences are significant. In contrast to the finding
that the productivity gap closes, this development is different. The value
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added per employee among Eastern German firms is diverging, although
only slightly. The companies which belong to a group with a Western Ger-
man or foreign parent company show a higher productivity in more recent
years. This underpins the hypothesis that the ownership generates posi-
tive spillovers with respect to managerial skills or simply to a better access
to markets. It does not seem that the subsidiaries of Western or foreign
enterprises are just exploited as “sweat–shops” by their parent companies.
Table 10:
Productivity of stand–alone firms versus group members after the
matchinga
Stand–alone Firms belonging
Variable Yearb companies to group
log(Employees) 1994 -2.10 -2.13
(in 1,000) 1998 -2.01 -2.01
Capital 1994 .05 .05
intensity 1998 .08 .07
Patent Stock 1994 .29 .29
dummy 1998 .44 .45
Propensity 1994 -.42 -.40
Score 1998 -.33 -.29
Value added per 1994 .04 .05***
employee (Mio. À) 1998 .05 .06***
Note: *** (**, **) indicate that the means differ at a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%).
a) The firm distribution over sectors is identical in both groups.
b) Obs. in 1994 (1998) in both groups: 580 (469)
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the productivity gap of Eastern German firms in
comparison to Western German firms. In general, the microeconometric
study confirms the macroeconomic facts. The firms operating in the
manufacturing sector are still lagging behind Western German firms in
terms of value added per employee. Although the productivity gap is
closing, the catching up process has slowed down in recent years.
I have proposed to use an econometric matching procedure to analyze the
productivity gap in Eastern Germany in more detail. If one agrees to use
comparable Western German firms as benchmark for productivity, this esti-
mation method does directly address the question, which productivity level
one could expect from an Eastern German firm with given characteristics,
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like industry classification, firm size, capital intensity, knowledge assets,
innovations and age.
Several applications of the matching procedure show that the productivity
gap remains significantly different from zero in all considered settings. I
come up with following key results: innovative firms from Eastern Germany
exhibit a higher gap to their control firms from Western Germany than
non–innovative firms. The Eastern German firms better catch up with
the low productive firms from the West. Note that this does not imply
that innovative firms are less successful in the East. In recent years they
have a higher productivity than non–innovating firms but still suffer from
a higher deficit in comparison to their Western German counterparts and
possible competitors. However, for both firm groups a significant gap does
still exist in 2000. Another interesting results which emerges from the
comparison of different firm categories is the importance of firm ownership.
If an Eastern German firm belongs to a group with a Western German or
foreign parent company, it will have a higher productivity than stand–alone
companies on average. This result does even hold when the group variable
is considered as endogenous, that is when the parent companies follow a
“picking the winner” strategy. Matching such Eastern German subsidiaries
with stand–alone firms does not destroy this result. The gap between
those two groups within Eastern Germany remains significant. In contrast
to the result that the gap between the East and the West closes over
time, the gap between these firms does slightly increase over time. This
diverging development points to the hypothesis of positive spillovers. Either
managerial skills are mediated via the ownership structure or simply a
better access to markets due to a well functioning distributional network of
the group members is provided.
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